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Schaber: Mis-taken on Lacan

MIS-TAKES ON LACAN:
The Manque Business ofPsychoanalysis
BENNET SCHABER

1. Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire
de Jacques Lacan, livre 1: Les
ecrits techniques de Freud (Paris:
Seuil, 1975), 292. "Nos actes
manques sont des actes qui
reussissent, nos paroles qm
achoppent sont des paroles
qui avouent. Ils, elles, revelent
une verite de derriere. A l'interieur de ce qu'on appelle associations libres, images du reve,
sympt6mes, se manifeste une
parole qui apporte Ia verite. Si
Ia decouverte de Freud a un
sens, c'est celui-la-verite rattrape l'erreur au collet dans Ia
meprise."

2. J. Lacan, Le seminaire de
Jacques Lacan, livre VII: L'ethique de Ia psych analyse (Paris:
Seuil, 1986), 308: "Le signifiant introduit deux ordres
dans le monde, Ia verite et
l'evenement."

3. J. Lacan, Telivision (Paris:
Seuil, 1974), 66: "Le suicide
est le seul acte qui puisse
reussir. ... "

+· Lacan, Le seminaire, livre

I,
chapter 21, "La verite surgit de
Ia meprise."

5. J. Lac an, Le seminaire de
Jacques Lac an, livre XI: Les
quatre concepts fondamentaux de
Ia psych analyse (Paris: Seuil,
1973), 40: " . .. en effet l'angoisse
est ce qui ne trompe pas." See
also: "Introduction to the
Names-of-the-Father Seminar,"
in Jacques Lacan, Television: A
Challenge to the Psychoanalytic
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Our abortive actions are actions which succeed, those of our words
whi.:h come to grief are words which own up. These acts, these words
reveal a truth from behind. Within what we call free associations,
dream images, symptoms, a word bearing the truth is revealed. If
Freud's discovery has any meaning, it is that-truth grabs error by
the scruffofthe neck in the mistake.1

T

HUS IN 1954 Jacques Lacan reminded his seminar what was at
stake in a practice calling itselfpsychoanalysis. And six years later, in a
seminar devoted to the ethics of that practice: «The signifier introduces
two orders into the world: the truth and the event/' 2 And later still, in a
television interview: «Suicide is the only successful act. m
Hence my anxiety at the task set before me (one I could only partially fulfill,
as you will note as I go on)-to say something about a teaching whose twists and
turns span thirty years. Anxiety, yes, but not about the prospect of making a
mistake, but of falling into error. Apparently they are not the same thing, at
least in the register ofpsychoanalytical utterances as such. «Truth," Lacan told
us, «emet;ges from the mistake." Or again: «The subJect is constituted in the
dimension of making a mistake.',. And finally, in an address I now direct to
myself: <<JJ.nxiety is that which does not deceive." 5
I introduce this essay (the transcript of a lecture delivered in January 1989)
with this barrage of quotations if only to provide a taste of the vaunted, infamous
density and even gnomic quality of a teaching and a speech, in short, a style,
named Lacan. It is to that speech, that style, and that name that I direct my
comments; as for the man, the life, you can go to the scandal sheets for that. Not
that it might not prove instructive, even important; but it would hardly be
decisive. Within the context ofa teaching that claimed to do nothing but «return
to Freud,'' to return to a reading of his text-we too can follow this route to see
Just how far Lacan got. And I would add, and with a real sense of assurance
here, without anxiety, that if anything interesting is still to be said about Freud,
it is thanks to Jacques Lacan.
Thus, in pondering over Just what might be at stake in introducing Lacan,
a dead man, to an audience for whom, really, he ought to have needed no
introduction, it struck me that first and foremost that stake was simply another
dead man-Freud himself And so I begin here with Freud-there will only
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ever be one-and let the dead bury, or in this case, introduce, their dead. For
was it not Freud who, at the dawn of our century, of our modernity that he
helped invent, noticed that the dead were once again beginning to speak?-in
dreams, jokes, slips of the tongue and the pen, in short, in our culture and its
science. Making curiosity the very precondition of the cure, uniting theory and
therapy, science and truth, Freud placed psychoanalysis in the midst and not to
one side of the world. Surrounded by darkness and hardly face-toface, Freud
made of analyst and analysand that couple at the very heart of culture for and
upon whom nothing would be lost, irrevocably. The analytic session maintains its
continuity with culture by fot;ging and peiforming a break with it. It actualizes
and gives body and speech to a discontent with and within the discourses of
civilization. Its complete assimilation to those discourses-whether behavioral
science, popular self-help, abject individualism, etc.- can only effect its complete
falsification.
One need only read On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement to
realize that Freud himself kn,ew that his teaching would be forgotten, would be
distorted; but he knew too that it would be re-membered, re-discovered, that the
institution he founded would continually repeat what it had first lived in theory.
In this sense Freudianism could only discover its truth as the re-discovery of that
truth: as a «return to Freud." It is here that the repressed and the return of the
repressed become exactly the same thing, a message Lacan spent thirty years
trying to hammer home, which is why it seemed, and still seems, to me that an
introduction to Lacan must always be a re-introduction to Freud, about whom
we could saftly say that a first reading is no longer possible. Lacan's self-styled
«return to Freud" is monumentally important not only because of its return to
the letter of Freud's texts but because of its very sensitivity to the function of
return within those texts.
What follows, then, was my attempt to take the function ofthe return, within
and to Freud-as dramatized by Lacan-seriously and to express this function
to an audience of psychiatrists, psychologists, and medical students at the State
University of New York Health Science Center (Syracuse, New York). My
thanks to Dr. Seymour Fisher, chair of the Department of Psychiatry, for his
kind invitation, and to Proftssor Pat Miller of the Department of Religion,
Syracuse University, for introducing us. Of course, my remarks were incomplete,
and how could it be otherwise? This is, in fact, a central lesson of Lacanian
theory: that the core of my being can only be registered as a lack or loss insofar as
it is established by the demand (the inscription of some other in me) that I put
my desire into signifying form, that is, in language. One cannot say everything,
not because of some deficiency in language, but because language installs that
deficiency, that insufficiency, within the subject who speaks, by virtue of which,
where it is a question of desire, there is always more, because there is always less.
It was Freud, listening to hysterics, phobics, obsessionals, who discerned the dialectic of this 'more or less' as a subject's attempt to decipher the sexual relation
-the gap gender inserts into humanity-and whose subjective import he named
castration. Lacan returns us to it, and like Freud, not Ivithout resistance.

I

Establishment, trans. D. Hollier,
R. Krauss, A. Michelson (New
York: Norton, 1990), 82 : "In
anxiety, the subject is affected
by the desire of the Other. He
is affected by it in a nondialectizable manner, and it is for that
reason that anxiety, within the
affectivity of the subject, is what
does not deceive." Lacan's seminar on anxiety remains unpublished.

WOULD LIKE TO SAY right off the bat that I am not a psychoanalyst, that I have no firsthand experience in analysis apart from
its texts, principally those of Freud and Lacan. My interest in psycho-
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E. Fromm, The Forgotten
Language: An Introduction to the
Understanding of Dreams, Fairy
Tales, and Myths (New York:
Grove Press, 1957).
6.

7. ]. Lacan, The Four Funda-

mental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, trans. A. Sheridan (New

York: Norton, 1977).

8. R. A. Shweder, "In ParisMiniskirts of the Mind," New
York Times Book Review, 8 January 1989, 1.
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analysis, however, is long-standing, ever since high school, when quite by
accident I chanced upon a copy of Erich Fromm's Fm;gotten Language. 6
Little did I know then that this language was more than a metaphor; this
lesson awaited my entrance into graduate school. Since then, the writings
of Jacques Lacan have been for me the object of an abiding passion; and
my own career, as literary critic, is hardly at odds with it, at least in
principle. One need only recall that Freud himself stipulated the universitas
litterarum, the universe of letters, or the university, as the ideal place for
the training of, at the least, lay analysts. And one might also recall that
neither Oedipus nor Hamlet was a patient of the Viennese doctor.
That said, I'd like to mention two things that came to my attention
recently. The first was a note from Dr. Fisher, informing me that he had
added what he called a "clarifying statement" to my title: "An exposition
of the basic concepts in the theoretical system of the French psychoanalyst,
Jacques Lacan." About this I will say quickly that when Lacan, in his
seminar of 1964, came to speak on the basic concepts of his system, they
turned out to be neither his concepts nor his system? The unconscious,
repetition, the transference, the drive-these were the four fundamental
concepts, and they are all Freud's, as is the system. To speak ofLacan is to
speak of Freud; and rest assured, that hardly simplifies things. Lacan never
claimed to do anything more than "return to Freud," although, as he was
to demonstrate time and again, the function of the return to and in Freud
was the destiny of anyone wishing to take on the name of psychoanalyst.
If, for example, one of the things we have inherited from Freud is a theory
of paternity, that theory finds its destination not only in the patient, the
analysand, but in the analyst, who puts his or her desire to the test every
time he or she embarks upon a practice under the name of Freud, the father
of a science with profound effects, even if disavowed, upon our entire
culture.
The second thing that came to my attention was an article that appeared
in the New York Times Book Review by one Richard A. Shweder, chair of
the Committee on Human Development at the University of Chicago and
president-elect of the Society for Psychological Anthropology, which I
suppose means that he is not only a scholar but a bureaucrat of sorts, so
he's got something of the best of both worlds. 8 In Shweder's article Lacan
is accused of (1) being French, which I suppose one has to own up to, and
(2) of possessing an impenetrable style, which Shweder concludes, without
the slightest hint of irony, is simply bad style, and worse still, out of style.
Apparently Lacan wrote run-on sentences; but when an analyst is accused
of being "impenetrable," well, something is up, or not, depending on how
you want to look at things.
I don't mean to simply sound glib here, because the whole affair in fact
turns out to be more serious than one might at first suspect. Shweder
reduces Lacan's thought to this sentence: "I think, therefore I am the
language I speak, which is a run-on sentence." No doubt you recognize
the formal play here on Descartes's famous dictum, "I think, therefore I
am." Shweder believes he parodies both Descartes and Lacan here, but the
price of this parody is a rather serious error. First, Descartes never reduced
Being, the sum, the I am, to thinking, the cogito, the I think, but made of
thinking the proof or minimal sign of Being, the ergo, the therefore. Being
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and thinking are not the same: that was Descartes's problem, and it remains
ours. To reduce the cogito ergo sum to an equation of identity would be
tantamount to saying that an animal is identical with the tracks it leaves in
the snow, a manifest absurdity. You have to follow the tracks to find the
animal, and you have to follow thought, which is always someone's
thought, to find a little bit of Being. You might be wondering what all this
can possibly have to do with psychoanalysis, since Descartes and Freud
would seem to have very little in common, especially since the latter is
credited with having undone the former precisely by discovering an other
reason, a reason beyond reason that he called the unconscious, which on
the face of things appears fairly irrational. So let me give you an example,
a fictive one, but for all that, instructive as a means of introducing Lacan.
Suppose this Mr. Shweder were to come to you. He has fallen ill, suffers
from anxiety attacks, can no longer write. "I am worthless," he says, "therefore my writing stinks." "Oh, come come, Mr. Shweder," you reply, "one
need only look at your impressive credentials to see that this can hardly be
the case." "What? You think I'm lying!" he shouts. "You think I'd pay all
this money just to pull the wool over your eyes?"
Let's stop there and note that there are two ways to take Mr. Shweder
at his word. On the one hand, we might do what Mr. Shweder himself
does with Descartes and Lacan: take his "I am worthless" as an absolutely
logical equation and conclude that what he needs is a course in self-esteem,
a strengthening of the ego, a role model; in short, someone to hold up to
him a mirror in which he might see reflected an image better than the one
he at present seems to have. Nothing Dale Carnegie or ego psychology
couldn't help him out with.
On the other hand, we might take a different path, which was that of
Freud and Lacan, and hear in his words a thought in excess of itself, a
thought leading to Being; that is, we might follow the tracks his discourse
lays down for us. He says he is "worthless," that his writing stinks, that he
is not "lying," not "pulling the wool over your eyes," and that he is "paying
all this money." There is a story being written here: about wool and worth,
about money and lies, and about a writing, a literary production, that
smells.
Perhaps it was like this: as a young child Shweder had been given a
dollar by his father. He went to Woolworth's to buy something. On the
way he lost his dollar, and later lied about it. This he has unconsciously
connected with an earlier story; as an even younger child he had defecated
in his pants. His father had asked him about it: "Did you make in your
pants, Richard?" "No," he had replied, lying. "But I can smell it," Dad had
replied, "it stinks." All this triggered an anxiety attack when a little white
lie about Descartes and Lacan appeared in the New York Times Book Review.
The words, the language, the tracks lead back to a style, a writing, scatological though it may be, that leaked out of his very Being and that the
child denied in the face of paternal censure. In trying to uphold a paternal
law-one does not shit in one's pants-he nevertheless broke it; and also
one does not lie. How not to lie and yet please the father? The impossible
problem, which our neurotic unconsciously solves by doing nothinguntil he arrives at the analyst's, perhaps only to find the father who will tell
him that when one lies one is not necessarily lying; that there are lies that
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9. Any reader unfamiliar with

the discourse I am presently entertaining will probably be
struck by my use of the pronominal form "it" when I speak
of the subject. I mean this use
to suggest that prior to assuming its status as gendered
(through castration) the subject
must be understood to be something fairly inhuman . In this
sense the law of castration can
be stated simply: one is either a
woman or a man, never both. In
short, there is no third sex to
mediate the absolute division
between the sexes. The psychoanalvtic name for this mediating· term is the phallus
("The Signification of the Phallus," in J. Lacan, Ecrits, A Selection, trans . A. Sheridan [New
York: Norton, 1977], 281-91).
By phrasing the law of castration this way I hope to stress
that it is not a law binding one
to a heterosexual choice of object. Homosexuals are as subject
to the law of castration as heterosexuals are. They too are
either men or women (Sigmund
Freud, Three Essays on the Theory
of Sexuality [New York: Basic
Books, 1975]) .
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tell the truth and someone willing to hear that truth beyond the lies. This
story, as I've already said, is a fiction, but a more common one than you
might think. Anyone with a child knows well how easily feces can become
the first implements of artistic expression.
The lesson here, which the real Shweder has not yet learned, is that one
is not the language one speaks; rather, within that speech a meaning in
excess of consciousness surges forth that leads toward the source of one's
Being, the formation of the unconscious, what Lacan called the 'in you
more than you'. And let me add that this little fable also contains those
four basic concepts I spoke of earlier: the unconscious, made manifest as
the return of the repressed in the patient's utterances; the drive, obviously
anal, but with its own grammatical form; the transference, the analyst
mistaken for the father; and finally repetition, of the grammatical form
of the drive, which would go something like this: the patient's inaugural utterance, "to want to write and not be able to," which repeats
a more primordial one written on the stage of the unconscious, namely,
"to want to please the father and not be able to," which itself will be inevitably repeated within the transference, "to want to be a father and not
be able to."
I want to close my fictive case presentation, which in fact I've drawn
from bits and pieces of several actual cases, to approach Lacan more directly. But first I must confess my own little lie. I told you that by tracking
the patient's words one might arrive at his Being; this is inaccurate. For in
the end I only led you to more words, although their grammatical form
was quite precisely structured and repeated. What we have found then is
not Being but a being, a speaking being. What Lacan attempts to elaborate
through Freud's work is that it is precisely by being a speaking being, a
subject of speech, that a woman or man is a subject of the unconscious,
and for that matter, not simply a being but a woman or man, a gendered
being. This is what I will now set out to demonstrate, with one more
detour, through structural linguistics. And I would remind you that this
encounter of psychoanalysis with linguistics is not exempt from the story I
have just told you, since it too repeats a prior encounter, of the infant with
language, by virtue of which that infant becomes a subject who speaks and
can therefore only know its Being as a lack of Being, a lack it and psychoanalysis itself will figure as castration. 9

J

ACQUES LACAN is associated with a movement known as Structuralism, about which I will say a few words. Structuralism is a form of
social theory that takes its bearings from certain discoveries of what
came to be known as structural linguistics, whose founder was the
Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and whose two most famous practitioners were Emile Benveniste and Roman Jakobson. Structural linguistics
begins with a number of formal propositions about the nature of language
that set it apart from previous historical or philological studies oflanguage.
r. The object of linguistics is a theoretical object, la langue, language

understood under its 'synchronic' aspect; that is, language as the
manifold of lexical, grammatical, phonological, and transformative
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rules at a given moment in time. La langue is the amalgam of all
possible utterances, all possible paroles, at any given moment. It is
not evolutionary but discrete and static, a theoretical object distinct
from what Saussure called le langage, language evolving through
history.
2. Within la langue the basic unit of linguistic study is the sign, which
can be graphic, phonic, pictorial, etc. Hence linguistics opens out
onto a general science of semiology, the study of signs-cultural,
natural, etc.-precisely structured as languages, les langues.
3· The sign has two aspects: a sensible signifier and an intelligible
signified, which Saussure compared with the recto and verso of a
sheet of paper. The connection between signifier and signified is
not natural but arbitrary; in other words the sign is unmotivated.
For example, there is no natural connection between the graphic
or phonic mark t-r-e-e and its concept or referent; it might have
just as easily been called arbor or Baum.
4. Within language, signs derive their meaning or linguistic value not
from the identity of signifier and signified but from the difference
among signs. For example, a red light on the wing of an airplane
does not mean stop, but a red light arranged in a sequence with an
amber and a green one does. In language there are no positive
terms, only differences. Difference founds even similarity; for example, the difference between a concept and its concrete instances
makes those instances similar.
s. The arrangement of linguistic utterances derives from the two
major axes of la langue: (r) the paradigmatic axis, also known as
the axis of substitution or metaphor; for example, all grammatical
categories like noun, verb, or adjective; and (2) the syntagmatic
axis, also known as the axis of contiguity or metonymy; for example, all grammatical or syntactical clusters like phrases, clauses,
or sentences. In short, the paradigmatic axis allows a sign to be
substituted for another-a big apple for New York City. The syntagmatic axis allows signs to be placed in contiguity-the big apple
never sleeps. The meaning of an utterance is therefore determined
retroactively through the scansion of paradigmatic choices and syntagmatic arrangement. Meaning, therefore, is not primarily nor
inaugurally referential but structural. Although words might be
acquired referentially, language, la langue, can only be acquired as
structure. Think, for example, of the value of a simple word like
"or," whose meaning is purely structural; it can only be determined
as a function of syntax-A or B-and as a function of paradigmit is not A and B.
These then are the principal propositions of structural linguistics. Language is understood as structure, and that structure is by its very nature
differential. Language begins not with the names of things but with the
difference between signs. Structuralism begins when language is thought
of as structure and as having structural or structurating effects.
Structuralism, therefore, applies the laws of structural linguistics to the
'languages' of culture. The French ethnologist and mythographer Claude
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Levi-Strauss was the first to fully carry out this kind of work. According to
Levi-Strauss, myths, rituals, and even table manners are languages, precisely structured, and give the exteriorized form of a culture thinking itself.
That is, cultural objects form concrete and systematic structures, the formal
coherence of which constitutes the ground or basic languages of culture.
People think not so much with their own minds as with and through the
systems of objects in which they are inscribed. These languages are structured differentially, through a series of fundamental oppositions. For example, studying various forms of food and cooking in traditional cultures,
Levi-Strauss postulated a fundamental opposition between the raw and the
cooked, which he associated with another opposition, that between nature
and culture. This second, more abstract opposition is thought bymeans of
the first. Therefore, through its culinary rituals, a society is able to think
its relation to the natural world and understand how it might be elaborated
and turned into culture.
I would like to stress that this exteriorized thought, what Levi-Strauss
called the "primitive mind," does not take the form of some universal
symbolization. What is at stake here is a certain articulation, a structure or
combinative order that precedes symbols, allows them to come into being,
to change their significations, etc. The "primitive mind" cannot be reduced
to a dictionary of symbols; it is a grammar of signs, a language. This
language makes up a kind of cultural unconscious that operates beyond
and in excess of any of its users. I do not create the language of my culture;
in a strong sense it constitutes me and enables me to think myself in
relation to it.
A very simple example would be the menu in a restaurant. It is structured like a language: its paradigmatic axis includes all possible appetizers,
entrees, desserts, etc.; its syntagmatic axis is the order of their appearance,
appetizers first, entrees second, etc. I produce a gustatory utterance, a
parole, when I order, when I create a meal. If, for example, I order three
desserts, that choice signifies, rather outrageously, only in relation to the
grammar of dining conventions, la langue of the dinner.
It is, therefore, important to note that the notion of language as culture
thinking itself is not an intentionalist theory, not a theory of consciousness.
The exteriority of the sign implies a difference and a distance between the
one who thinks and the representation of that thought in signs. There is
always a certain amount of slippage between what I am, my Being, and
what I say I am, my meaning. Take a simple and very common example,
love. I always want to be loved for what I am, not for anything anyone can
say about me. Don't love me because I'm so good looking or so terribly
charming, love me for myself. Hence love is always a little bit crazy, precisely because it pushes language to its limit, exposes the gap between
representations and what they represent.
The attempt to elaborate this gap between representation and what it
represents, which is nothing but the bar between signifier and signified,
marks the turn from Structuralism to what is now called Poststructuralism,
which explores the irreducibility of cultural signifiers to the signifieds or
subjects they claim to represent. Representation becomes the central problematic for thinking about culture and its constitutive members. For example, and to rephrase a traditional Marxist proposition, society might
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now be thought of in terms of the contradiction not between means and
forces of production but between means and forces of representation, making alienation or estrangement the central fact of civilization, and more
radically, and here Lacan comes into play, of the subject who speaks, who
represents itself in language and hence alienates part of its being there.
Before pressing this any further, let me say a few words about the notion
of the subject and how I am using this term here. This concept too is taken
from linguistics, where the subject is primarily a grammatical category, the
subject of a sentence, represented by the pronoun, the 'shifter', I. "I think,
therefore I am." The subject here would be anyone capable of representing
him- or herself as the "I" of the sentence. But as noted at the opening of
my talk, the subject here is a bit more complicated than that. There are in
fact two subjects here: one of the "I think," one of the "I am." I tried to
show that they cannot be reduced to a simple identity because the subject
of Being does not refer precisely to the subject of thinking. The subject of
thinking here is what linguists call the 'subject of the statement', that is,
the grammatical marker as it might be read on a piece of paper. The subject
of Being is what linguists refer to as the 'subject of the utterance', the
subject capable of speaking or writing the proposition. The subject in
language is therefore a profoundly divided or split subject, divided between
its statements and the uttering of those statements, between the event and
its meaning (whose logical and temporal disjunction is so clearly marked
in Descartes's ergo) .
Let me give another example, this one drawn from Freud's Jokes and
Their Relation to the Unconscious, which will return us once again to the
question of lies and truth. It deals with a simple statement, but one not so
simple that philosophy has ever really gotten a handle on it. The statement
is this: "I am lying." We all know the game here; if I really am lying, then
I'm telling the truth, which makes me doubly a liar, and so forth. If I am
not lying, then I lie anyway, and the same result follows . So how does one
determine the tmth or falsity of the statement? This is how Freud settled
the question.
"Two Jews met in a railway carriage at a station in Galicia.
'Where are you going?' asked one. 'To Cracow,' was the answer.
'What a liar you are!' broke out the other. 'Ifyou say you're going
to Cracow, you want me to believe you're going to Lemberg. But
I know that in fact you're going to Cracow. So why are you (ving
to me?'''
This excellent story, which gives an impression of over-subtlety,
evidently works by the technique of absurdi~v. The second Jew is
reproached because he says he is going to Cracow, which is in fact
his destination! But the poweiful technical method of absurdi~v is
here linked with another technique, representation by the apposite,
for, according to the uncontradicted assertion of the first Jew, the
second is lying when he tells the tru:th and is telling the truth by
means of a lie. But the more serious substance of the joke is the
problem of what determines the truth. The joke, once again, is
pointing to a problem and is making use of one of our commonest
concepts. Is it the truth if we describe things as they are without
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ro . Sigmund Freud, Jokes and
Their Relation to the Unconscious
(New York: Norton, 1963), ll5 .

II.

Ibid.

troubling to consider how our hearer will understand what we say?
Or is this only jesuitical truth) and does not genuine truth consist
in taking the hearer into account and giving him a faithfUl picture
of our own knowledge? I think that jokes of this kind are sufficiently
different from the rest to be given a special position. What they are
attacking is not a person or an institution but the certainty of our
knowledge itself one of our speculative possessions. The appropriate
name for them would therefore be "sceptical)) jokes. 10
Let me translate this episode into some of the linguistic terms with which
I've been barraging you. Freud divided the subject of the statement from
the subject of the utterance. The subject of the statement is "I am lying."
But the subject of the utterance is "I am deceiving you ." Hence the possibility of truth or falsity derives not from the relation of words to what they
signify but from the subject's ability to represent itself in language as other
than it is for another person. I represent myself as something for some
other. The truth therefore is not a function of reference but of a signifying
scansion, an interpretation. Spoken to someone else, the "I am going to
Cracow" might have been an absolutely truthful statement, despite its
referential function remaining the same in both cases: he is in fact going to
Cracow.
The "I am going to Cracow' is a signifier that represents a subject, a
deceiving subject, for someone else. This someone else is itself a signifier,
the unspoken "you" of the statement, which we can now reformulate as "I
tell you that I am going to Cracow." The "I tell" is the subject, represented
by the signifier "I am going to Cracow" for another signifier, "you ."
Freud's fable allows us to determine the subject of this "you," which is a
subject who will not be deceived, that is, the analyst, Freud himself, a Jew.
Freud called this a "sceptical joke" because it "attacks the certainty of
our knowledge itself"; 11 and in this sense he has given us an exact picture
of the unconscious as that which threatens the certainty of our conscious
statements. Of course, Freud did not have the opportunity to elaborate on
this joke using the tools of linguistics; nevertheless, it is easy to see how
close he came using what tools he did have. Lacan, however, was able to
bring together linguistics and psychoanalysis, the result being not only a
return to Freud via new insights into language but also a return to language
via psychoanalysis.

W

HAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO in this next section is list six
Lacanian propositions and then elaborate on each of them. In
a sense they have informed everything I have already said, so
they also have the advantage of being something of a review.
A signifier represents a subject for another signifier, not another
subject (which was the lesson of Freud's joke) .
2. The unconscious is structured like a language, that is, the unconscious is a language, a structure (which gives the subjective meaning to Levi-Strauss's ethnology).
3. The unconscious is the discourse of the Other (which seems to be
a rather gnomic statement, until you recall the radical exteriority
r.
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of language to the subject who represents itself there, that is, its
radical alterity, its otherness).
4. There is no Other of the Other (that is, in the attempt to locate
the exact meaning of its being, the subject has no recourse to
anything other than its own words, which cannot be reduced to
the identity of meaning and Being, something I showed in my
Shweber case).
s. Fantasy founds verisimilitude (which for now I will simply gloss
as: reality does not precede structure, but that which is taken
or mis-taken for reality is an effect of structure, the structure of
fantasy) .
6. The status of the unconscious is not ontological but ethical (in
other words, the unconscious is not a localized place, neither the
seat of primal instincts nor some portion of the brain, but the gap
between signifier and signified, signifier and subject, or to say
much the same thing, the difference between the subject of statement and utterance. This gap implies ethical obligations, since the
subject, who is always other than her- or himself, radically depends
upon some other to maintain her or his desire).
Let me now double back and go over these propositions, one at a time.
r. Lacan modified Saussure's definition of the sign by freeing the signifier (which he called the letter, the minimal unit of language, the material
support of discourse, and in itself radically insignificant) from the grip of
the signified (the concept or the subject) . Language begins not with the
sign but with the difference between two signifiers ("rna" and "pa," to take
a hardly trivial example). Language therefore does not primordially mean
but primordially structures; it forces and compels me to represent myself
inaugurally as a pure difference: I am by virtue of what I am not, and as
such I am for something or someone. A subject's being is a being for,
which means that in psychoanalysis a symptom, for example, is not a symptom of something but a symptom for someone, a message, a parole. For
example, a red light is not representative of the concept stop; it represents
something for green, which returns to red its meaning. "What you mean
is stop," Ms. Green would say to Mr. Red, if lights could speak. "Thank
you," Mr. Red would respond, "for now I understand that you mean go."
"My word, you are right," Ms. Green might reply. Call red the patient,
call green the analyst, and you are on your way toward understanding
something about analysis. Call red the man, call green the woman, and you
will see why the mysteries of gender must always be deciphered in the
other sex.
This last example is, of course, not just any old example, so I will give
a hint about its resolution, using what Lacan called his parable of the
urinals: 12

Lacan, "The Agency of the
Letter in the Unconscious or
Reason since Freud," in Ecrits,

12.

146-78.
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HOMMES+---+ DAMES
HOMMES

•

DAMES

•

gar~on

X

fille

A boy and a girl are sitting face to face on a train; as it pulls into the
station, the little boy exclaims, "Look, we're at Ladies!" "Not at all, you
idiot," the little girl replies. "We're at Men." Note two points here. First,
the signifiers Hommes and Dames have the same signified, the door. This
was as far as Saussure's sign could go. But the signification here is the
meaning attached to Hommes through the response it awakens in Dames
and vice versa. Meaning is the spark that flashes from the friction of two
signifiers. Second, the signifier Hommes represents a subject, the little girl,
the .fille, for another signifier, Dames. The signifier Dames represents a
subject, the little boy, thegar.ron, for another signifier, Hommes. The two
little subjects represent themselves in the register of a pure signifying difference, that between Hommes and Dames. To truly decipher that difference, each would have to get through the other's door; but as we all know
the laws of urinary segregation, that way is barred. The field then of desire,
of sexual difference, is determined by language, by the differential law of
the signifier, not by the biological imperatives purported to exist at the
level of the signifieds. And as the crossed arrows make clear, heterosexual
desire is in no way a destiny, but the effect of a law of difference, a law that
Freud tells us is laid down with the oedipal stage. Hence Lacan's little
picture gives you the very image of two Freudian postulates: an original
bi-sexuality (there are two sexes, but who can tell which is which) and the
embryo of heterosexual desire, once the law is laid down, once the door is
barred to the object of desire.
The field of capital letters in the picture is what Lacan called the field of
the Other, the field of language and the law, the law of difference. A
subject's identity as well as its desire can be deciphered only there, in a field
radically exterior to it. The exteriority of the signifier to the subject opens
up the gap between a subject and the discourse that forms the unconscious,
the field of the Other. In a moment I will show you how this takes place
through what Freud called Urverdriingung, primal or primary repression.
2. The unconscious is structured like a language, a redundant phrase
since language and structure are exactly the same thing. That is, the unconscious is an effect of the structuration of the subject by language, which
always comes to the subject from some other person. In short, the subject
(and not the individual) is nothing but a story someone once told it, which
gives you a kind of linguistic version of the primal scene as primal signifying incursion. The signifier, therefore, is at the origin not only of a subject's
identity qua subject but of the drives and their perversions, that is, the
perversion or deviation of biological need into discursive demands. For
example, as a response to its cry, the infant receives not just milk but also
a signifier of parental desire, love or care. Later on in life, this child, say in
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response to an overwhelming of parental love in the form of a surfeit of
food, might choose not to eat, to starve itself, only showing that, even in a
case of anorexia, its etiology might be traced to a signifying disorder, a
subject's unconscious and abject dependence upon a signifier, food . In this
sense it is inaccurate to say that anorexics do not eat; rather they eat
nothing, since nothing is the last signifier available to them with which to
carve out a desire and a love beyond the caregivers'. And again, eating
nothing is not so much a symptom of something as a symptom for someone, the mother, for example. "A little nothing, that's what I wanted from
you, just once to say no, so that something might have been forbidden,
something taboo. I could have desired at least that." I hope you see just
how easily this discourse might graft itself onto the sexual scenario of the
two toilets, where the law, the barred door, gave itself over as the prohibition determining the regulation of sexual desire and identity. Like good
hysterics, anorexics take their bodies as ciphers upon which to practice the
cryptography of sexual difference. The gap between woman and man inscribes itself upon the body as the empty mouth. The anorectic symptom
is, therefore, a demand addressed to parental desire: "How can I be everything to both of you? Or must I be everything for one of you and nothing
for the other?" The signifying relation of woman or man plays itself out as
the dialectic of fat and skinny, everything and nothing. Anorexics are not
stuck at some supposed oral stage of development; instead, they play with
castration at the site of the mouth and make of eating and not eating the
corporeal correlative of speech and silence. 13
3- The unconscious, therefore, is the discourse of the Other, a surging
forth of signifiers-in dreams, slips of the tongue, jokes, free associations,
symptoms, for example-of a particular set of signifiers and not a general
battery of universal symbols (which is what we find in, say, Jung). This
field or locus of the Other is formed quite simply because, as human beings,
that is, as speaking animals, we are forced to ask for what we need. All
brute needs become alienated in the linguistic form in which we must
demand them. Hence the possible fulfillment of our needs is always deciphered by someone else in the form in which we ask for that fulfillment. In
return we always get too much or too little. When you subtract the demand
from the need, something is always left over, something that cannot be put
precisely into words. This little bit left over Lacan called the "objet petit a,"
the object of desire. Even for the anorexic, all of whose needs seemed to
be fulfilled, something remained unsatisfied, the objet petit a, that nothing
is still desired, even if that desire remains purely oral.

13. No doubt anorexia has sociological determinants, especiallv the social determination
of thinness as the ideal of femininity. Nevertheless, one of its
consequences is precisely the
destruction of the corporeal
signs of femininity, loss of periods, or a body resembling a
little bov's. The anorexic, then,
would seem to conform herself
not to an ideal female but to an
ideal third or non-sex. She becomes an ideal phallus, the ratio
of parental desire.

+- There is no Other of the Other; that is, there is no metalanguage, no
language beyond language with which to take account of the unconscious
or with which to effect a cure. Psychoanalysis always leads back to a signifying scansion, to the economy of speech as such. The analyst hears here
and there in the patient's discourse words that have lost their meaning,
that partake of an empty circulation; these words must be returned to some
economy that might restore their value. This is what Anna 0. called the
"talking cure," and it awaits the patient as some response from the Other,
from the unconscious that the analyst helps to make manifest if only
through silence or returning back to the patient his or her own words. As
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in Freud's joke, the truth of a patient's speech is determined not by that to
which it refers but by deciphering to whom it is addressed.
A true story: a student complains to me about the trouble she has taking
exams. "I just can't seem to connect the dots, you know? I can write papers,
but with tests, forget it." And she adds later on, speaking about her mother's attempts to "set her up" with guys, "you know, I have this fear of
coffee. If I even smell it I get really nervous." She can remember the onset
of this phobia. One morning, as a little girl, she saw her mother and father
share a cup of coffee. "I just became disgusted," she says. "Later on they
divorced." She can associate the word "coffee" with some homonyms, her
father's cough and a family name (on the mother's side) . I am not an
analyst and hence in no position to supply an interpretation. Anyway, she
shows up at my office a little too frequently, and I have a feeling that her
self-professed love of writing papers means love of writing them for me
(and it turns out that her mother is, like me, an English teacher). But I can
hear the discourse of the Other in her words: the homonymic displacements around the signifier coffee, their relation to her parents' failed marriage and to her own origins, and the connecting of dots, also failed, like
her mother's attempts at matchmaking. She wants to make good on all
this. Luckily, she cannot. Coffee is her obJet petit a; it marks out in her
speech a field of pure loss that sustains her desire as it repeatedly reanimates
and renegotiates its own history. Unlike the anorexic who sustains the
parents' desire by alternately playing the role of its lack and that of its
fulfillment, this young woman knows, unconsciously, how to make a lack
sustain her own desire within sexual difference. She does not ask me to
connect the dots for her. She wants to make of their failed connections the
story of her own desire, her own success.

s. Fantasy founds verisimilitude, le vraisemblable. Fantasy, which Lacan
called the support of the subject and whose installation terminates an analysis, names the relation of the subject to the obJet petit a. The relation of
the subject to this fleeting object of desire is that which grounds it at the
level of the preconscious by setting the stage, as it were, for all of its
libidinal scenarios. Fantasy is the stage, desire's mise-en-scene, and all the
world plays upon it. The theatrical metaphor here is in fact quite literal.
When you go to the theatre, the first thing you invest (or cathect, as the
Standard Edition translates Besetzung, which in fact is the German word
for casting a play-Besetzen ein Schauspiel) is the stage, the phantasmatic
ground upon which the actors enter and exit. My student's story about
coffee provides a convenient example. It may well be a pure fabulation;
however, it operates unconsciously as the primal fantasy recording her
simultaneous presence at and separation from the primal scene of her sexual
origins. It sets the stage for desire by marking out places for its missing
object as well as for the gendered actors who play the game of hunting that
object down. For her that object, coffee, is forbidden and hence installs the
gap between male and female. The fantasy, then, positions her as a gendered subject over and against a lost object. The world is real to her as long
as it partakes of this structure. There are many dots with which she can
connect as long as the ideal dot, Ms. or Mr. Right, never appears to bring
the entire scaffolding crumbling to the ground.
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6. Finally, the status of the unconscious is not ontological but ethical.
This is perhaps the most difficult although the most imperative part of
Lacan's teaching. I don't have the time here to discuss Lacan's contribution
to ethical thought in anything but a suggestive way. Let me say this much,
however. All previous ethical thought usually began with some notion of
the Good, which is taken to be unary, or at least univocal, and gave rise to
categorical statements like "all men desire the Good" or Kant's categorical
imperative that demands that one be able to form a universal, moral statement for any of one's actions. Lacan began not with the One, the Good,
the Same, but with the two, desire and the other. What the unconscious
made clear to Lacan is that no one is master of her or his own truth. I
always receive my truth as a message from some other, and I love that
truth, that good (not the Good), that meaning, only insofar as some other
makes me hear it. The price of my autonomy is the recognition of my
heteronomy, the radical dependence of my being and meaning upon some
other. Care for myself, then, can only ever be really effected through care
for others.
Since Freud, psychoanalysis has always been practiced in pairs, has always begun with at least two. This is not an accident: the Other, the field
in which is inscribed the law of my desire and hence my truth and my
good, is not subject to direct interrogation. When it speaks (or, when the
id speaks), it only does so through mistakes. "Truth emerges from the
mistake." Hence, to interrogate the Other, I put some other (person) in its
place and submit my desire to that other. To find the Other, I must mistake
it for some other. It is this other's ethical duty to finally disabuse me of
that notion, tell me that he or she, as my analyst, is also not the master of
my truth-in short, we are both castrated, cut off from our origins.

Our abortive actions are actions which succeed> those of our words
which come to grief are words which own up . .. . Within what we
call free associations> dream images> symptoms>a word bearing the
truth is revealed. IfFreud>s discovery has any meaning> it is thattruth grabs error by the scruff of the neck in the mistake.
This was Lacan speaking in 1954-; nineteen years later, if only to add poignancy to this early pronouncement, he concluded: "Suicide is the only
successful act."
Let me try to make this clear by fulfilling an earlier promise to speak of
primary repression. The subject, as we have seen, is an effect of the infanfs
(the infans> that which does not speak) encounter with a signifier. That
encounter, however, was a profoundly missed encounter, precisely because
there was not yet any subject to take account of it. Hence the signifier that
caused my original passion and heralded my emergence into the world of
language cut me off from a prior state of being that I will forever feel as a
loss, a lack of being, manque-a-etre. I will mistake this loss for some lost
object, a lost signifier. And in a sense I will repeat this missed encounter
interminably the rest of my life. All my actions, my words, my dreams will
be an "act of homage to a missed reality," 14 a miss that the oedipal scenario
will revalue as castration-"! am cut off from something." No greater
tragedy can then befall the subject than to fulfill this encounter, to fulfill its
desire (which, as you know, is how the gods punished Oedipus, giving
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him the thing he desired that he would never have taken on his own, his
mother).
Castration reminds us that we are all, women and men, cut off from
something essential, deprived of a little bit of the real. None of us is master
of her or his own truth, nor master of the other's. We are all deprived of
the Good, which leaves open to us a world of plural goods, in which we
all must have the right and obligation to find our own ways, with a difference. This is what Lacan deciphered in linguistics and in Freud: difference
is the law, and if it is broken, one only finds the tyranny of the master, the
state, the censor, or the police. All those who preach the doctrines of
success-and you can see them on TV, in the bookstores, selling you a
diet, a God, a country-preach the doctrine of a society whose deepest
desire is to suicide itself. Psychoanalysis, with Lacan, becomes the social
science posed against society; it should remain the thorn in everyone's
side. +
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